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Abstract
We study approximation algorithms for graph pricing with vertex capacities yet
without the traditional envy-free constraint. Specifically, we have a set of items V and
a set of customers X where each customer i ∈ X has a budget bi and is interested
in a bundle of items Si ⊆ V with |Si| ≤ 2. However, there is a limited supply of
each item: we only have µv copies of item v to sell for each v ∈ V . We should assign
prices p(v) to each v ∈ V and chose a subset Y ⊆ X of customers so that each i ∈ Y
can afford their bundle (p(Si) ≤ bi) and at most µv chosen customers have item v in
their bundle for each item v ∈ V . Each customer i ∈ Y pays p(Si) for the bundle
they purchased: our goal is to do this in a way that maximizes revenue. Such pricing
problems have been studied from the perspective of envy-freeness where we also must
ensure that p(Si) ≥ bi for each i /∈ Y . However, the version where we simply allocate
items to customers after setting prices and do not worry about the envy-free condition
has received less attention.
With unlimited supply of each v ∈ V , Balcan and Blum (2006) give a 4-approximation
for graph pricing which was later shown to be tight by Lee (2015) unless the Unique
Games conjecture fails to hold. Our main result is an 8-approximation for the capaci-
tated case via local search and a 7.8096-approximation in simple graphs with uniform
vertex capacities. The latter is obtained by combing a more involved analysis of a
multi-swap local search algorithm for constant capacities and an LP-rounding algo-
rithm for larger capacities. If all capacities are bounded by a constant C, we further
show a multi-swap local search algorithm yields an
(
4 · 2C−1C + 
)
-approximation. We
also give a (4 + )-approximation in simple graphs through LP rounding when all ca-
pacities are very large as a function of .
We use a reduction by Balcan and Blum to the case of bipartite graphs where all
items on one side must be assigned a price of 0 holds in this setting as well. However,
unlike their setting, the resulting problem remains APX-hard even if all items have at
most 4 copies to sell. We also show our multi-swap analysis is tight using an interesting
construction based on regular, high-girth graphs.
∗This research was undertaken, in part, thanks to funding from the Canada Research Chairs program
and an NSERC Discovery Grant.
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1 Introduction
Choosing prices to sell items in order to maximize revenue is a complicated task even in
environments where one can be certain of customer behaviour. Indeed, many so-called
pricing problems have been studied in combinatorial optimization. One popular setting is
this: a collection of items V is available to be sold where we have µv ∈ Z≥0 ∪ {∞} copies
of item v ∈ V . Additionally, we are given a collection of customers X where each i ∈ X
has some budget bi ≥ 0. In the single-minded setting, each customer i ∈ X is interested in
a bundle Si ⊆ V . We must assign prices p : V → R≥0 to the items and sell them to some
customers Y ⊆ X while respecting two constraints:
• Affordability: p(Si) :=
∑
v∈Si p(v) ≤ bi for i ∈ Y , and
• Supply Constraints: |{i ∈ Y : v ∈ Si}| ≤ µv for v ∈ V .
That is, each customer that is allocated their bundle can afford it and no item is oversold.
Such a solution (p, Y ) is said to be feasible, and the goal is to find a feasible (p, Y )
maximizing revenue, i.e.
∑
i∈Y p(Si).
Much attention has been given to the envy-free setting, where a feasible solution must
additionally satisfy the property p(Si) ≥ bi for i /∈ Y or to the unlimited supply setting
where µv = ∞ for each v ∈ V . Observe that in the unlimited supply setting, any pricing
yields an envy-free solution by simply choosing the customers that can afford the price.
However, the problem still remains hard in the setting with unlimited supply of each item,
see the related works section.
The single-minded, envy-free pricing (SMEFP) problem with limited supply was studied
by Cheung and Swamy [7]. Somewhat informally, they show the following. If there is an LP-
based α-approximation to the problem of choosing the best customers Y when given prices
p (without regard to the envy-free condition), then there is an O(α · logC)-approximation
to SMEFP where C = maxv∈V µv. In the special case where |Si| is bounded by a constant
for each i ∈ X, this yields a logarithmic approximation for SMEFP.
We study single-minded pricing problems yet without the envy-free constraint. This is
a natural variant of pricing problems where customer satisfaction is less of a concern than
overall revenue generation. To the best of our knowledge, it seems that pricing problems
without the envy-free condition like this have received virtually no attention so far except
in simpler cases of unlimited supply where envy-freeness is a superfluous constraint (i.e.
any solution can be trivially be made envy-free without losing revenue).
More specifically we mainly consider the case when |Si| = 2 for each customer i. Here,
the set of customers can be thought of as edges E in a graph G = (V,E) with vertex ca-
pacities indicating the number of copies of the item/vertex that can be sold. We show that
without the envy-free condition, the problem admits a constant-factor approximation. In
fact, it is relatively easy to get a 16-approximation using randomized rounding (with alter-
ations) of an LP relaxation. Our primary focus is on obtaining smaller constants through
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a more intricate local search approximation algorithm. We also show how a combined ap-
proach using linear programming and local search can yield even better approximations in
certain settings.
1.1 Our Results
We use shorthand notation like e = uv ∈ E when we want to consider an edge e ∈ E in
some graph G = (V,E) and also want name the endpoints u, v of e. This allows us to name
distinct customers (i.e. e) who are interested in the same bundle of items (i.e. {u, v}). As
mentioned earlier, we focus on the following problem.
Definition 1. Let G = (V,E) be a graph with vertex capacities µv ∈ Z≥0 ∪ {∞} where
each e = uv ∈ E has a budget be ≥ 0 and is interested in the bundle of vertices {u, v}. In
Capacitated Graph Pricing, we want to find a pricing p : V → R≥0 and F ⊆ E such
that (p, F ) is a feasible solution to the pricing problem. The goal is to maximize revenue:∑
e=uv∈F p(u) + p(v).
All of our algorithmic results extend in a simple way to the case where each customer is
interested in a bundle of size at most 2, but it is slightly simpler to describe the algorithms
and their analysis for the case where each customer wants precisely two different items.
Unless otherwise stated, the graph G may have parallel edges. We use the term simple
graph to indicate it does not have parallel edges, meaning no two customers want exactly
the same bundle.
To get approximations for Capacitated Graph Pricing, we use the reduction from
Balcan and Blum [3] to reduce to the case of a bipartite graph where all items on one side
must be given a price of 0. Specifically, we consider the following problem.
Definition 2. In L-Sided Pricing, we are given a Capacitated Graph Pricing in-
stance in a bipartite graph (L ∪ R,E). A feasible solution (p, F ) must also have p(v) = 0
for each v ∈ R.
Though they only focused on uncapacitated pricing problems, the reduction in [3] easily
shows an α-approximation for L-Sided Pricing yields a 4α-approximation for Capaci-
tated Graph Pricing. We remark that the reduction would not be valid if one were
looking for envy-free solutions. A key difference between the uncapacitated case studied in
[3] and the capacitated case we work with is that L-Sided Pricing remains hard if there
are capacities.
Theorem 1. L-Sided Pricing is APX-hard, even if all capacities are at most 4 and all
customers have a budget of 1 or 2.
So we turn to approximation algorithms. It is possible to get a 4-approximation for
L-Sided Pricing through straightforward rounding of a natural linear programming relax-
ation that is presented in Section 5, thus leading to a 16-approximation for Capacitated
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Graph Pricing overall. We consider an alternative approach to get better approximation
guarantees.
Our main algorithmic results are summarized as follows.
Theorem 2. There is a polynomial-time 2-approximation for L-Sided Pricing.
This 2-approximation is fairly simple to obtain using local search. But we think it nicely
highlights a direction for to designing approximations for pricing+packing problems.
We obtain slightly improved bounds in simple graphs with uniform capacities.
Theorem 3. Instances of L-Sided Pricing in simple graphs where all vertices in L∪R
have the same capacity µ admit a randomized, polynomial-time 1.952381-approximation.
For Capacitated Graph Pricing, this yields a 7.8096-approximation.
This is obtained through a hybrid of local-search techniques and LP rounding tech-
niques: if µ is bounded by some appropriate constant then a multi-swap local search
algorithm is used, otherwise we use a randomized LP rounding approach.
For the first part, we consider a more involved algorithm for L-Sided Pricing with
bounded capacities (that need not be uniform).
Theorem 4. For any constants C ≥ 2,  > 0, there is a polynomial-time (2C−1C + )-
approximation for instances of L-Sided Pricing with µv ≤ C for all v ∈ L.
Note this does not require any bounds on capacities for nodes in R. For example
with C = 2 this yields a (1.5 + )-approximation and in the case we prove is APX-hard
(C = 4) this yields a (1.75 + )-approximation. Observe if C = 1 then both Capacitated
Graph Pricing and L-Sided Pricing reduce to maximum-weight matching because we
can easily set prices to match the full budget of all edges in any matching.
Theorems 2 and 4 are proven using local search algorithms. That is, if we are given
prices p : L→ R≥0 then the optimal customers F ⊆ E can be computed using a maximum-
weight µ-matching algorithm. The local search algorithm for Theorem 2 iteratively tries
to change the price of one item in L to see if it yields a better matching. We prove with a
simple argument that a local optimum is a 2-approximate solution for L-Sided Pricing.
To prove Theorem 4, we consider a local search algorithm that changes O,C(1) prices
at a time in each step. To analyze the performance of such an algorithm, we need a
result about covering directed graphs by directed balls in a uniform way. This may be of
independent interest in other settings, so we state it here.
Let H = (L,F ) be a directed graph. For any u ∈ L and r ≥ 0 consider the “directed
ball” B+(u, r) = {v ∈ L : dH(u, v) ≤ r} of nodes in L reachable from u in at most r steps.
Similarly, let ∂B+(u, r) = {v ∈ L : d(u, v) = r} be nodes v such that the shortest u − v
path in H has length exactly r (the boundary of B+(u, r)). We prove the following covering
result for directed graphs.
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Theorem 5. Let H = (L,F ) be a directed graph where the indegree of each node is at most
C and let d ∈ Z≥0. There is a “weighting” of directed balls τ : L × {0, 1, . . . , d} → Z≥0
with the following properties:
• For any v ∈ V ,
∑
u∈L,0≤r≤d
s.t. v∈B+(u,r)
τ(u, r) =
d∑
i=0
Ci =
Cd+1 − 1
C − 1 .
• For any v ∈ V ,
∑
u∈L,0≤r≤d
s.t. v∈∂B+(u,r)
τ(u, r) = Cd.
Furthermore, τ(u, r) ≤ Cd−r for each u ∈ V and 0 ≤ r ≤ d.
That is, each v ∈ L lies in these balls with weight precisely Cd+1−1C−1 and appears on the
boundary of the balls with weight precisely Cd. The bound on τ(u, r) at the end of the
statement is a required to ensure the local search algorithm used to prove Theorem 4 runs
in polynomial time.
We also show the analysis of both algorithms are tight. See Section 3 for definitions of
the two local search algorithms mentioned in the results below and Section 4 for precise
statements of how the analysis is tight. Slightly informal statements of the results are
mentioned here.
Theorem 6. For any  > 0, the locality gap of the single-swap algorithm (Algorithm 1)
can be as bad as 2− .
Theorem 7. For any C ≥ 2, ρ ≥ 1,  > 0, the locality gap of the ρ-swap algorithm
(Algorithm 3) on L-Sided Pricing instances having maximum capacity at most C can be
as bad as
(
2C−1
C − 
)
The first construction is quite simple, but the second construction for the multi-swap
analysis is much more involved. As a starting point for the construction, we require simple,
regular graphs of constant degree but arbitrarily large girth. Such graphs were shown to
exist by Sachs [18].
Instances of L-Sided Pricing satisfying µv =∞ for v ∈ R can be solved in polynomial
time by a greedy algorithm that simply chooses the best price at each vertex: customers
incident to different vertices in L have no interaction [3]. So it is natural to wonder if we
can get better approximations if capacities are large. Though it is not our main result, we
confirm the intuition that larger capacities yield better approximations (in simple graphs)
through randomized rounding of an LP relaxation.
Theorem 8. For any  > 0, there is some C ≥ 0 such that instances of Capacitated
Graph Pricing in simple graphs satisfying µv ≥ C admit a randomized, polynomial-time
(4 + )-approximation.
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1.2 Related Work
The basic model of pricing problems of this sort were introduced by Guruswami et al.
[13]. Among other results, they give an O(log n + logm)-approximation for the case of
single-minded pricing without item capacities if we have n items and m customers. Here,
the bundle Si for each customer i may be any subset of items (not just size 2). This
was later improved by Briest and Krysta to an O(logD+ log k)-approximation where each
set has size at most k and each item appears in at most D sets [4]. The logarithmic
approximation is essentially tight: Chalermsook et al. show for any constant  > 0 there
is no O(log1−(m+ n))-approximation unless NP ⊆ DTIME(npolylog(n)) [5].
If all customers are interested in a set of size at most k, Balcan and Blum give an O(k)-
approximation which specializes to a 4-approximation in the case k = 2 [3]. Amazingly,
this may also be tight: building on work by Khadekar et al. [15], Lee showed that there
is no (4 − )-approximation when k = 2 for any constant  > 0 unless the Unique Games
conjecture fails [16].
Cheung and Swamy studied the envy-free variant of capacitated pricing problems [7].
As mentioned earlier, they show that LP-based approximations that choose the maximum-
profit set of customers for given prices translate to approximation algorithms for envy-free
pricing with capacities while losing an O(logµmax)-factor. In particular, for envy-free
Capacitated Graph Pricing they get an O(logµmax)-approximation.
Other variants of envy-free pricing problems have been studied, we do not attempt to
comprehensively survey all such models and just sample a few to discuss. For example, it
could be that each customer is interested in acquiring just a single item from their subset
(rather than all items). This was also studied in [13] and follow-up work (eg. [9]). Other
directions have considered more restricted subsets of items in single-minded pricing, for
example the customers may be interested in the edges of a subpath of a large path (the
highway problem) or subpaths of a tree (the tollbooth problem). See [12] and [11] for
definitions and state-of-the-art approximations for these problems.
1.3 Organization
Section 2 introduces notation and discusses the reduction from Capacitated Graph
Pricing to L-Sided Pricing. Section 3 gives the local search algorithms to prove Theo-
rems 2 and 4. The tightness of the analysis of these local search algorithms is presented in
Section 4. The randomized LP rounding algorithms and, ultimately, the proof of Theorem
3 appears in Section 5. The APX-hardness proof appears in 6.
2 Preliminaries
We consider graphs that may have parallel edges, unless we explicitly specify otherwise. We
do not consider loops. It is easy to extend our result to cases where some customers may
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only be interested a singleton bundle. A brief discussion of this can be found in Appendix
A.
For a set of nodes S in a graph G = (V,E), we let N(S) denote all nodes not in S that
are neighbours of some node in S. For u ∈ V we let δG(u) be all edges having u as an
endpoint. Often the subscript G is omitted when it is clear from the context. For a subset
of edges B, we let δB(u) = δ(u) ∩B, again when the graph G is clear from the context.
Again, we sometimes refer to an edge e by uv where u, v are the endpoints of e. For
brevity, we may use notation like e = uv ∈ E when we want to consider an edge e ∈ E but
also want to name the endpoints u, v of e as well. The reason for using this notation rather
than simply saying uv ∈ E is that our local search algorithms do work for graphs with
parallel edges (i.e. customers interested in identical bundles), so e would be one particular
customer and u, v would name the items that e is interested in.
Given a function f : T → R on some finite set T , for any S ⊆ T we let f(S) denote∑
x∈S f(x). Similarly, if p : V → R≥0 is a pricing of the vertices of a graph G = (V,E), for
an edge e = uv ∈ E we let p(e) denote p(u) + p(v). For two pricings p, p′ : V → R≥0 of the
nodes of a graph, we let HW(p, p′) = |{v ∈ V : p(v) 6= p′(v)}|, the number of vertices with
different prices between p and p′.
Finally, consider an instance G = (L ∪ R,E) of L-Sided Pricing where edges have
budgets be and vertices have capacities µv. For any pricing p of the vertices, let val(p) =
maxF⊆E and (p,F ) feasible
∑
e∈F p(e) be the maximum profit of a feasible solution with
prices p. Note that val(p) can be computed in polynomial time as it is merely asking
for a maximum-weight µ-matching solution using only edges e = uv with p(e) ≤ be (the
weight of such an edge being p(e)).
2.1 Reduction to L-Pricing
To begin, we use a reduction by Balcan and Blum [3] which was stated originally only for
the uncapacitated case. We sketch the proof for completeness.
Lemma 1 (Balcan and Blum [3]). If there is an α-approximation for L-Sided Pricing
then there is a 4α-approximation problem for Capacitated Graph Pricing.
Proof. Let G = (V,E) be an instance of Capacitated Graph Pricing with capacities µ
and budgets b. Randomly form L by including each vertex independently with probability
1/2 and set R = V − L. Discard all edges with both endpoints in the same set of the
partition. Consider an optimum pricing p∗ for G and corresponding set of customers
F ∗ ⊆ E. Let F ′ be the restriction of F ∗ to edges e with endpoints in each of L and R and
consider prices p′ where p′(u) = p∗(u) for u ∈ L and p′(v) = 0 for v ∈ R. One can easily
check E
[∑
e∈F ′ p
′(e)
]
= 14 ·
∑
e∈F ∗ p
∗(e).
This can be efficiently derandomized because we only require pairwise independence of
the events u ∈ L for various u ∈ V , see [17] for details behind this technique.
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3 Local-Search Algorithms
We consider local-search algorithms for L-Sided Pricing. Recall we are given a bipartite
graph G = (L ∪ R,E) where each v ∈ L ∪ R has a capacity µv ≥ 0, each e ∈ E has a
budget be, and we are restricted to setting p(v) = 0 for each v ∈ R.
It is clear that there is an optimal solution p such that for each u ∈ L we have p(u) = be
for some e ∈ δ(u). Otherwise we could increase p(u) to the next budget of an edge touching
u (or decrease, if p(u) exceeds all budgets of edges touching u) while not decreasing the
value of the solution. So, for u ∈ L we define Pu = {be : e ∈ δ(u)} to be the set of budgets
of customers interested in item u.
We run a local-search approximation based on this observation. Here, a vector p over
L is a pricing if p(u) ∈ Pu for each u ∈ L. The local-search algorithm iteratively tries to
improve a pricing by changing the price of only one vertex until no such improvement is
possible. The full algorithm is presented in Algorithm 1. Because a price p(u) is chosen
from Pu for each u ∈ L, it is clear that an iteration can be executed in polynomial time.
Algorithm 1 Single-Swap Algorithm for L-Sided Pricing.
let p be any pricing
while val(p′) > val(p) for some pricing p′ with HW(p, p′) = 1 do
p← p′
return p
Call a pricing p locally optimal if it cannot be improved by changing the price for any
u ∈ L, note Algorithm 1 returns a locally-optimal pricing. As is common in local search,
we analyze the quality of a locally-optimal solution. In the next subsection we show
val(p) ≥ val(p∗)/2 where p∗ is an optimal pricing for the L-Sided Pricing instance.
The main concern is then the efficiency of the algorithm. Clearly each iteration can
be executed in polynomial time but the number of iterations is not apparently bounded.
We use a more recent observation from [10] to find a solution which may not be a local
optimum but is still guaranteed to have value at least 1/2 of the optimum value (no -loss
in the guarantee, like one would expect using older methods). The simple application of
this trick is discussed in Appendix B.
3.1 Single-Swap Analysis
We fix p∗ to be some particular optimal pricing.
Theorem 9. For any locally-optimal pricing p, val(p) ≥ val(p∗)/2.
Proof. Let B ⊆ E be the edges that are bought in the local optimum solution, and B∗ ⊆ E
the edges that are bought in the global optimum solution. Thus, val(p) =
∑
u∈L p(u) ·
|δB(u)| and p(e) ≤ be for each e ∈ δB(u).
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For each u ∈ L, consider the local search step that changes the price of u from p(u) to
p∗(u). That is, consider pu where pu(u) = p∗(u) and pu(u′) = p(u′) for u′ ∈ L − {u}. We
refer to this swap as the p → pu swap. For brevity, let ∆u := val(pu) − val(p) and note
∆u ≤ 0 because p is a local optimum. We provide a lower bound on ∆u in a way that
relates part of the global optimum with part of the local optimum.
First, construct a subset B′ ⊆ B∗ and an injective mapping σ : B′ → B iteratively
as follows in Algorithm 2. Intuitively, it greedily pairs some edges in B∗ with edges in B
sharing the same endpoint in R until no more pairs can be made. After this pairing, for
each v ∈ R we either have δB∗(v) ⊆ B′ or δB(v) ⊆ σ(B′) (or both).
Algorithm 2 Constructing B′ and σ.
B′ := ∅
for each e∗ = uv ∈ B∗ where v ∈ R do
if there is some e ∈ δB(v) such that no e′ ∈ B∗ has σ(e′) = e then
set B′ := B′ ∪ {e∗} and σ(e∗) := e
Now we bound ∆u. One possible matching with the modified prices p
u is
Bu := B ∪ δB∗(u)− δB(u)− {σ(e) : e ∈ δB′(u)}.
A simple inspection of the definition of B′ and σ shows this is feasible. That is, it alters
B by swapping δB(u) for δB∗(u) and removes edges paired, via σ, with δB∗(u) to make
room across nodes in R for these new edges. It could be that some edges in δB∗(u) are
not paired by σ but this indicates their right-endpoints already have enough room already
to accommodate these edges without removing other edges from B. So, Bu respects the
vertex capacities.
Now, ∆u represents the cost change when using the maximum value matching with
the new profits. This can be bounded as follows, based on the fact that Bu is a feasible
solution under prices pu:
0 ≥ ∆u ≥ p∗(u) · |δB∗(u)| − p(u) · |δB(u)| −
∑
e′∈δB′ (u)
p(σ(e′)).
Summing over all u ∈ L and noting each e ∈ B has its corresponding term appearing in the
last sum for at most one u ∈ L because σ′ is one-to-one shows 0 ≥ val(p∗)−2 ·val(p).
3.2 An Improved Multi-Swap Algorithm for Bounded Capacities
Here we consider the restriction of L-Sided Pricing to instances where µu ≤ C for each
u ∈ L for some fixed constant C.1 Note we do not require capacities of v ∈ R to be
bounded.
1Capacitated Graph Pricing with C = 1 is equivalent to maximum-weight matching. We can easily
set prices to get the full budget of all edges from any matching.
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Let d ≥ 1 be a fixed integer: larger d will result in better approximation guarantees
with a slower, but still polynomial-time, algorithm. The multi-swap algorithm we consider
is given in Algorithm 3. Let ρ = 1 + C + C2 + . . . + Cd = C
d+1−1
C−1 . An iteration runs in
polynomial time because ρ is a constant.
Algorithm 3 Multi-Swap Algorithm For L-Sided Pricing.
let p be any pricing
while there is a pricing p′ with HW(p, p′) ≤ ρ and val(p′) > val(p) do
p← p′
return p
As before, call a pricing p locally optimal if val(p′) ≤ val(p) for any pricing p′ with
HW(p, p′) ≤ ρ. Recall Pu for u ∈ L is the set of distinct budgets of the edges incident to u and
that, in L-Sided Pricing, we can assume any pricing p has p(u) ∈ Pu for all u ∈ L. So, as
C and d are constants, a single iteration can be executed in polynomial time by trying all
subsets S ⊆ L of bounded size and, for each of those, trying all ∏u∈S(|Pu| − 1) ≤ |E|O(1)
ways to change the prices of all u ∈ S. We prove the following approximation guarantee.
Theorem 10. Let p be a locally-optimal solution and p∗ a global optimum solution. Then
val(p) ≥ C−C−d
2C−1−C−d · val(p∗).
So for any fixed C ≥ 2 and  > 0 we can choose d large enough to get a
(
C
2C−1 − 
)
-
approximation for instances of L-Sided Pricing where all capacities of nodes in L are
bounded by C. We can use the trick from Appendix B to ensure the number of iterations
is polynomially-bounded.
We will soon prove Theorem 5 stated in Section 1.1. For now, we show how to complete
the local search analysis using this result. Let p∗ denote an optimal pricing, B ⊆ E the
edges bought in the local optimum p, and B∗ ⊆ E the edges bought under p∗. Let
σ : B′ → B be a pairing constructed in the same way as in the single swap analysis (using
Algorithm 2) where B′ ⊆ B∗.
To describe the swaps used in the analysis, first consider the following auxiliary directed
graph H = (L,F ) whose nodes are the same as the left-side of this L-Sided Pricing
instance and whose edges are given as follows. For any e∗ = uv ∈ B′, let w ∈ L be the
left-endpoint of σ(e∗). Add a directed edge from u to w in F .
Observe that both the indegree and outdegree of a vertex in H is at most C by this
construction, so Theorem 5 applies. Let τ : L × {0, 1, . . . , d} be the given weighting of
directed balls in H. These weights will be used to combine inequalities generated by the
test swaps below.
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Choosing the Test Swaps
For any u ∈ L and any 0 ≤ i ≤ d, consider the prices pu,i defined by
pu,i(v) =
{
p∗(v) if dH(u, v) ≤ i
p(v) otherwise
Note HW(p, pu,i) = |B+(u, i)| ≤ C0 +C1 + . . .+Ci ≤ ρ because the outdegree of each vertex
is at most C, so p → pu,i is a valid test swap. Let ∆u,i = val(pu,i) − val(p) and note
∆u,i ≤ 0 by local optimality. We bound the difference by explicitly describing a feasible
set of edges Bu,i, namely:
Bu,i = B ∪ δB∗(B+(u, i))− δB(B+(u, i))− σ(δB′(∂B+(u, i))).
That is, add all edges from B∗ touching a vertex in the directed ball B+(u, i) and
remove all edge from B that either touch B+(u, i) or are paired (via σ) with an edge in
B′ that touches ∂B+(u, i). It is again easy to check that (pu,i, Bu,i) is a feasible solution:
across u ∈ L we simply exchanged edges in B touching U for edges in B∗ touching u and we
ensured any new e∗ ∈ B′ has σ(e∗) removed to make room for e∗ across its right-endpoint.
Observe for any e∗ ∈ δB′(B+(u, i− 1)) that σ(e∗) is already removed when δB(B+(u, i)) is
removed from B, which is why the last part of the definition of Bu,i only uses the boundary
∂B+(u, i) instead of all of B+(u, i) to remove the remaining edges of B that are paired
with δB′(B
+(u, i)).
Weighting the inequalities by the values τ(u, i) from Theorem 5,
0 ≥ τ(u, i) ·∆u,i ≥ τ(u, i) ·
 ∑
e∈Bu,i
pu,i(e)−
∑
e∈B
p(e)

= τ(u, i) ·
∑
e∈B∗∩Bu,i
p∗(e)− τ(u, i) ·
∑
e∈B−Bu,i
p(e). (1)
It remains to consider the contribution of each edge in B∗ and B to this bound if we
sum over all u ∈ L, 0 ≤ i ≤ d. Observe an edge e = vw ∈ B∗ is “swapped in” in this
analysis for the swap p → pu,i if and only if v ∈ B+(u, i). So by Theorem 5, the total
contribution of p∗(e) to
∑
u,i τ(u, i) ·∆u,i is precisely C
d+1−1
C−1 · p∗(e).
On the other hand, an edge e = vw ∈ B is “swapped out” in this analysis for the swap
p → pu,i if and only if v ∈ B+(u, i) or σ−1(e) ∈ ∂B+(u, i) (if e is indeed paired by σ).
Again by Theorem 5, the total τ -weight of the first event is exactly C
d+1−1
C−1 and, if σ
−1(e)
is defined, the total τ -weight of the second event is exactly Cd. Thus,
0 ≥
∑
u∈L0≤i≤d
τ(u, i) ·∆(u, i) ≥ C
d+1 − 1
C − 1 · val(p
∗)−
(
Cd+1 − 1
C − 1 + C
d
)
· val(p),
which proves Theorem 10.
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3.3 Proof of Theorem 5
Before presenting the full proof to conclude the analysis, we consider a simpler setting to
develop intuition. Suppose, for each 0 ≤ i ≤ d and each u ∈ L there are precisely Ci nodes
w ∈ L with dH(w, u) = i. This would happen if, say, H has indegree and outdegree exactly
C at each vertex and the undirected version of H has girth > 2d. Then setting τ(u, i) = 1
if i = d and 0 otherwise for each u ∈ L would suffice.
In the general setting without this assumption, we have to consider other directed balls
B+(u, i) for different 0 ≤ i ≤ d and with, perhaps, larger weights than 1. This is because
the radius-d balls B+(u, d) themselves for various u ∈ L do not cover each v ∈ L precisely∑d
i=0C
i times.
Inductively define τ(u, i) for u ∈ L and 0 ≤ i ≤ d as follows:
τ(u, i) =

1 if i = d,
Cd−i −
d∑
j=i+1
∑
v∈L:dH(v,u)=j−i
τ(v, j) otherwise.
The inspiration behind this construction is that in general we would have dH(u, v) = i
for only at most Ci nodes u. So we consider smaller directed balls to make up this deficiency.
If we think that the distance i requirement for each v ∈ V is exactly Ci, then for each
u ∈ L the ball B+(u, j) contributes to the distance d − j + dH(u, v) requirement for each
v ∈ B+(u, j). See Figure 1 for an illustration.
The recurrence above ensures the total contribution to the distance i requirement for
each v by all all directed balls is exactly Ci. We formalize this idea and show the τ values
are nonnegative in Lemma 2 below.
u
6 5
4
v
Figure 1: Illustration of the case d = 6 where dH(u, v) = 4. The directed ball B
+(u, 6)
contributes to the “distance 4” requirement for v, B+(u, 5) contributes to the “distance 5”
requirement for v, and B+(u, 4) contributes to the “distance 6” requirement for v.
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Lemma 2. For each u ∈ L, 0 ≤ i ≤ d we have
d∑
j=i
∑
v∈L:dH(v,u)=j−i
τ(v, j) = Cd−i and
0 ≤ τ(u, i) ≤ Cd−i.
Proof. The equality is by construction and the observation that dH(v, u) = 0 if and only
if v = u. The inequalities are proven inductively with the base case i = d being given.
Now suppose for i < d we know 0 ≤ τ(u, j) ≤ Cd−j for any i < j ≤ d and any u ∈ L.
By the recurrence for τ(u, i) and because τ(v, j) ≥ 0 for any i < j ≤ d and v ∈ V , we see
τ(u, i) ≤ Cd−i. Next, we prove τ(u, i) ≥ 0 for each u ∈ L.
For any i < j ≤ d and any v ∈ L with dH(v, u) = j − i, there is some w ∈ L such that
dH(v, w) = i− j − 1 and dH(w, u) = 1. That is, consider a shortest v − u path P in H, as
i < j, we have v 6= u so the second-last node on this path is a node w whose distance to u
is 1 (it could be w = v, if j − i = 1).
From this and using the equality from the first part of the theorem statement, we bound
the double sum in the recurrence defining τ(u, i) by
d∑
j=i+1
∑
v∈L:dH(v,u)=j−i
τ(v, j) ≤
∑
w:dH(w,u)=1
d∑
j=i+1
∑
v∈L:dH(v,w)=j−(i+1)
τ(v, j)
=
∑
w:dH(w,u)=1
Cd−(i+1)
≤ Cd−i.
The last bound follows as each v ∈ L has indegree at most C in H. Thus, from the
recurrence again, we see τ(u, i) ≥ 0.
Lemma 2 finishes the proof of Theorem 5 as follows. The first bullet point in Theorem
5 follows by summing over all 0 ≤ i ≤ d. The second point follows by fixing i = 0.
4 Locality Gaps
For an instance of L-Sided Pricing and a value ρ ≥ 1, we say its locality gap with
respect to the ρ-swap heuristic is the maximum of val(p
∗)
val(p) over pricings p that cannot
be improved by changing the value of up to ρ entries p(v) where p∗ is any optimal pricing.
That is, the locality gap is the worst possible approximation guarantee of a local optimum
for that instance.
4.1 Single-Swap
Theorem 11. For any C ≥ 1 and  > 0, there is an instance Φ = (G,µ, b) of L-Sided
Pricing where all u ∈ L have capacity C and all v ∈ R have capacity 1 such that the
locality gap of Φ is at least 2−  with respect to the single-swap heuristic.
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Thus, our single-swap analysis is tight. While this is most striking when C = 1, we
remark it is still interesting for larger C because it is not obvious, a priori, that the single-
swap algorithm’s analysis cannot be improved as the capacities in L increase.
Proof. For n ≥ 2, consider the graph Gn,C = (L ∪ R,E), L = {ui : 1 ≤ i ≤ n} and
R = {vi,j : 1 ≤ i ≤ n, 1 ≤ j ≤ C}. The edges are the union of the edges on the paths
Pj = {u1, v1,j , u2, v2,j , . . . , un, vn,j} for 1 ≤ j ≤ C. We use µu = C for u ∈ L and µv = 1
for v ∈ R.
The budgets are given as follows. First let ELOC = {uivi,j : 1 ≤ i ≤ n, 1 ≤ j ≤ C} and
EOPT = {uivi−1,j : 2 ≤ i ≤ n, 1 ≤ j ≤ C}. All edges in ELOC have a budget of 1 and all
edges in EOPT have a budget of 2.
Using p∗(u) = 2 for every vertex in L and corresponding edges EOPT is a solution with
value of 2C(n − 1). Now consider the solution with p(u) = 1 for each vertex in L. This
solution is just ELOC with a value of Cn, which can be seen to be the optimal matching
under these prices because the capacity of every vertex in L is saturated by ELOC . Note
val(p) =
(
1
2−2/n
)
· val(p∗). We claim this is a local optimum with respect to the single-
swap heuristic.
The only possible swap is to change the price of some ui to 2. If i = 1, this is clearly
not an improving swap because no edge incident to u1 can afford the new price and all
other vertices are priced 1 so no matching has value ≥ n− 1. So suppose i ≥ 2.
The only edges incident to ui that can afford this new price are (ui, vi−1,j) for all
1 ≤ j ≤ C. Furthermore, for any µ-matching B that does not use an edge e ∈ δEOPT (ui),
we can get a better µ-matching (with respect to the new prices) by adding e to B and, if
necessary, removing some edge of ELOC ∩B sharing the right-endpoint with e.
Thus, the optimum matching after changing p(u) to 2 uses all of δEOPT ∩B. After fixing
these edges, which have total value 2C, it is easy to see the best matching we can get in the
graph obtained by removing the endpoints of edges δEOPT (u) ∩ B (plus all edges incident
to these endpoints) has value at most C(n− 2). So this is not an improving swap.
4.2 Multi-Swap
Before presenting the lower bound, we describe a construction of a layered graph with high
girth and particular degree bounds. The construction is depicted in Figure 2.
Lemma 3. For any C ≥ 2, ρ ≥ 1 and t ≥ 1 there is a simple, layered, and bipartite graph
Gt = (L ∪ R,E) with consecutive layers L1, R1, L2, . . . , Lt, Rt where the subgraph induced
by Li and Ri is a (C, 1)-biregular bipartite graph and the subgraph induced by Ri and Li+1
is a (1, C)-biregular bipartite graph (for each relevant i). Further, Gt has girth exceeding
2t · ρ.
Note, this implies |Li| = |L|/t and |Ri| = |R|/t = C · |Li| for each 1 ≤ i ≤ t.
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Figure 2: An example with C = 2. Left: the bipartite graph H constructed from H ′ in
the proof of Lemma 3. Right: the resulting graph Gt with t = 4. Edges of E′ are solid
and the edges of E∗ are dashed.
Proof. In [18], it is is shown that for any C ′, g ≥ 3 there is a simple, connected C ′-regular
graph whose girth (i.e. shortest cycle length) is at least g. In our setting, this means a
(2C)-regular graph with girth exceeding ρ · t exists where ρ, t are as in the statement of
Lemma 3. Call this graph H = (V, F ′′).
As H is (2C)-regular and connected it contains an Eulerian circuit. Direct all edges
along this circuits so each vertex of H has indegree C and outdegree C. Finally, build a
bipartite graph H = (A ∪B,F ) where A and B are disjoint copies of V where u ∈ A and
v ∈ B is an edge of F if uv is a directed edge obtained when we directed the Eulerian
circuit.
Build the following layered graph Gt = (L ∪ R,E). For each 1 ≤ i ≤ t, let Li be a
set of size V and Ri be a set of size |F |. Recall that both A and B in H are viewed as
copies of V in H ′, so each Li can be viewed either as a copy of A or as a copy of B, when
appropriate. Now, for each u ∈ A, each e ∈ δH(u), and each layer 1 ≤ i ≤ t, add an edge
in Gt from the copy of u in Li to the copy of e in Ri. Call the set of all such edges added
for a given i E′i. Similarly, for each v ∈ B, each e ∈ δH(u), and each layer 1 ≤ i ≤ t − 1,
add an edge in Gt from the copy of e in layer Ri to the copy of v in Li. Call the set of all
such edges added for a given i E∗i .
Then let L = ∪ti=1Li, R = ∪ti=1Ri and E = (
⋃t−1
i=1 E
′
i ∪ E∗i ) ∪ E′t. This construction is
depicted in Figure 2 in Section 4.
To complete the analysis, consider a simple cycle C in Gt. Note that C alternates
between using nodes in L and nodes in R. Furthermore, if C uses nodes consecutive nodes
a ∈ Li, b ∈ Rj , c ∈ Lk (where |j− i| ≤ 1 and |k−j| ≤ 1) then the nodes of H corresponding
to a and c are connected by an edge in H that corresponds to node b. Thus, the cycle C
corresponds to a circuit C ′ of Ht with |C ′| = |C|/2. Here, C ′ may use an edge more than
once so |C ′| measures the steps taken by the circuit C ′.
Consider any node a ∈ C ∩L and say it is a copy of node v of H. Because the cycle C
is simple in Gt, then the two adjacent nodes b, b′ to a on C correspond to distinct edges in
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H incident to v. This is true for every a ∈ C ∩ L, so the set of nodes of H corresponding
to nodes in C ∩ L are incident to at least two distinct edges traversed by C ′. That is,
the edges used on the circuit C ′ contain a cycle. As the girth of H is at least ρ · t, then
|C| = 2 · |C ′| ≥ 2 · ρ · t.
Theorem 12. For all C ≥ 2, ρ ≥ 1 and  > 0, there is an instance Φ = (G,µ, b) of
L-Sided Pricing where all u ∈ L have capacity C and all v ∈ R have capacity 1 such the
locality gap if Φ is at least 2C−1C −  with respect to the ρ-swap heuristic.
That is, our bound on the locality gap for the multi-swap algorithm on instances with
bounded capacity is tight.
Proof. Fix C ≥ 2, ρ ≥ 1,  > 0 and let t be such that 2C−1C · t−1t ≥ 2C−1C − . Let
Gt = (L ∪ R,E) be the graph from Lemma 3 for these parameters C, ρ, t. For each
1 ≤ i ≤ t, let E′i be the edges connecting Li to Ri and for each 1 ≤ i < t let E∗i be the
edges connecting Ri to Li+1. Naturally, let E
′ = ∪ti=1E′i and E∗ = ∪t−1i=1E∗i . See Figure 2
for an illustration. Let n be such that |Li| = n and |Ri| = C · n for all 1 ≤ i ≤ t.
The optimum is at least (2C − 1) · C · (|L| − n), which can be seen by using edges E∗
where each vertex in L has a price of 2C − 1. Now consider the pricing p that uses price C
for each vertex in L. The optimum set of edges to buy with these prices is E′ with a value
of C · C · |L|. The proof of the following claim appears below.
Claim 1. The pricing p is locally optimal with respect to the ρ-swap procedure.
If so, then the locality gap of this instance is as bad as 2C−1C · |L|−n|L| = 2C−1C · t−1t , as
required.
Proof of Claim 1. Consider any pricing p′ with HW(p, p′) ≤ ρ. Let X ⊆ L be the nodes v
with p(v) 6= p′(v). So p′(v) = 2C − 1 for v ∈ X. If some vertex v ∈ X lies in L1 6= ∅ then
no edge incident to v can afford the price 2C − 1, so we may assume that X ∩ L1 = ∅.
We show val(p′) ≤ val(p). We first claim any optimal set of edges M∗ under this price
includes all of δE∗(X) and excludes all of δE′(X). The latter is simple, no edge in δE′(X)
can afford the price of its endpoint in L. Then if any e ∈ δE∗(X) is missing from M∗, we
can get an even better solution by adding e and removing, if necessary, an edge of E′ ∩M
sharing its R-endpoint with e. The value increases by at least (2C − 1)− C = C − 1.
So M∗ contains all edges of δE∗(X) with value 2C−1 each plus some edges in δ(L−X)
(which could be in either E′ or E∗) with value C each. We then see the value of M∗ is
(2C − 1) · C · |X|+ C · |δM∗(L−X)|. (2)
The rest of the proof focuses on showing the following:
|δM∗(L−X)| ≤ C · |L| − (2C − 1) · |X|. (3)
If this holds, we can bound 2 by C · C · |L| thus showing val(p′) ≤ val(p).
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To show 3, first consider the graph G′ obtained from Gt by directing all edges to higher
layers: so an edge in E′i is directed from Li to Ri and an edge in E
∗
i is directed from Li to
Ri+1. Let S consist of Rt plus all nodes reachable from X in G
′, including X itself. We
claim |δinG′(S)| = C · n. This can be seen easily:
|δinG′(S)| = |δinG′(S)| − |δoutG′ (S)| =
∑
v∈S
|δinG′(v)| −
∑
v∈S
|δoutG′ (S)| =
∑
v∈S∩Rt
|δin(v)| = n · C.
The first equality holds because δoutG′ (S) = ∅ by construction of S, the second holds for any
cut of any directed graph, and the third holds because S ∩ L1 = ∅ (as X ∩ L1 = ∅) and
because every vertex not in L1 or Rt has equal in- and out-degree.
Now let Y be all endpoints of edges in δE∗(X) and let G
′′ be the subgraph of G′ obtained
by deleting Y and incident edges. Let S′ = S−Y , we claim |δG′′(S′)| ≤ n ·C−(C−1) · |X|.
One should think that δG′′(S
′) is obtained by deleting edges of δinG′(X)∩δinG′(S) from δinG′(S).
There are precisely C · |X| edges in δinG′(X), we show at least (C − 1) · |X| of there were
also in δinG′(S).
To that end, consider an edge e ∈ δinG′(x) for some x ∈ X that does not lie in δinG′(S).
Then v is reachable from some other node of X in G′ by construction of S, pick the
deepest such node and call this node τ(e). By this choice for τ(e), there is a τ(e) − x
path in G′ that avoids every other vertex in X. Also, the length of this path is at most
2t because the paths are monotone with respect to the layers of G′. Also note for two
different e, e′ ∈ δinG′(x) − δinG′(S) that τ(e) 6= τ(e′), or else we have two different τ(e) − x
walks implying there is a cycle of length at most 4t in Gt which is not possible.
Build an auxiliary graph T = (X,F ) where for each e ∈ δinG′(x)−δinG′(S) for some x ∈ X
we include an undirected edge from τ(e) to x in F . By the above discussion, this is a simple
graph. We also claim it is a forest, otherwise consider a cycle C in T . Focus on some edge
xy ∈ C and let z /∈ {x, y} be another node in C. As the xy-path from the construction
in the last paragraph avoids z, we get two different x − y walks in Gt by following the
paths corresponding to the two directions around C from x to y. But this is impossible
because Gt has no cycle of length at most 2t · |X| ≤ 2t · ρ. So, |F | ≤ |X| − 1 meaning
|δinG′(X)− δinG′(S)| ≤ |X| − 1. Thus,
|δinG′′(S′)| ≤ C · n− (C − 1) · |X|. (4)
Now we can prove 3. Let G
′′
be the undirected version of G′′, so G′′ is obtained from
Gt by deleting Y and its incident edges from Gt. Call a subset of edges of G
′′
a matching
if they satisfy the capacity constraints of nodes in G
′′
. Note δM∗(L−X) is a matching.
We bound the size of a maximum matching in G
′′
. First, observe M := E∗ − δ(X) is
a matching in G
′′
and that G′′ is the directed graph we get by directing edges along this
matching. That is, the set of L1−Rt paths in G′′ are exactly the set of M -alternating path.
By the max-flow/min-cut theorem, the maximum number of edge-disjoint M -alternating
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paths is at most |δinG′′(S′)| ≤ C · n− (C − 1) · |X|. So the maximum size of a matching in
G
′′
is at most
|M |+C ·n−(C−1) · |X| = C ·(L−n)−C · |X|+C ·n−(C−1) · |X| ≤ C · |L|−(2C−1) · |X|.
This proves 3 and completes the analysis of the locality gap.
5 LP-Based Approximations
So far, our focus has been on approximations based on local search. Here, we consider
linear programming relaxations for L-Sided Pricing. Recall for each u ∈ L that Pu =
{be : e ∈ δ(u)} is a set of possible prices for vertex u: there is an optimal solution that
selects p(u) from Pu for each u ∈ L.
For u ∈ L and p ∈ Pu, we let yu,p be a variable indicating we select price p for u.
Similarly, for each e = uv ∈ E and p ∈ Pu such that p ≤ be, we let xe,p be a variable
indicating edge e is selected and vertex u is assigned price p (so e buys their bundle at
price p). The following relaxation provides an upper bound on the optimal solution to the
given instance of the L-Sided Pricing.
maximize:
∑
e=uv
∑
p∈Pu
p · xe,p (LP-Pricing)
subject to:
∑
p∈Pu
yu,p = 1 ∀ u ∈ L (5)∑
e∈δ(u)
xe,p ≤ yu,p · µu ∀ u ∈ L, p ∈ Pu (6)∑
e=uv∈δ(v)
∑
p∈Pu
xe,p ≤ µv ∀ v ∈ R (7)
xe,p ≤ yu,p ∀ u ∈ L, e ∈ δ(u), p ∈ Pu s.t. p ≤ be
(8)
x, y ≥ 0
Constraints 5 indicate one price must be selected for each u ∈ L, 6 ensures the capacity
constraints for u ∈ L are satisfied and 7 ensures the capacity constraints for v ∈ R are
satisfied, 8 ensures we must set the price of u to p if we are to have e pay p.
5.1 Randomized Rounding Algorithms
We first show in simple graphs with large capacities for R, the integrality gap is close to 1.
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Theorem 13. For  > 0, the integrality gap of (LP-Pricing) is 1 − 2 in simple graphs
when µv ≥ 3 ln(1/)/2 + 1 for all v ∈ R.
Proof. Consider the following randomized rounding algorithm. For each u ∈ L, sample a
price p′(u) ∈ Pu from the distribution with Pr[p′(u) = p] = yu,p. This is a distribution by
5 and nonnegativity of y. For brevity, we will let p′(e) = p′(u) for an edge e = uv.
Then define a fractional matching in G as follows. The idea is that we want to assign a
value of xe,p′(e)/yu,p′(e) to each edge, this is at most 1 by 8. By 6 this fractional matching
would always satisfy the capacity constraints for nodes in L. But it may violate constraints
for nodes in R. The obvious solution would be to scale each of these fractional values to
be a feasible matching satisfying all vertex constraints. We take a simpler view which is
sufficient for our purposes, we scale all resulting values by 1− , and then outright discard
edges e = uv where the capacity of v is still violated after this scaling.
More precisely, for each e = uv we first let x′′e = (1− ) ·
xe,p′(e)
yu,p′(e)
(using 0 if p′(e) > be).
Then for each edge e = uv, we define
x′e =
{
x′′e if
∑
e′=u′v∈δ(v) x
′′
e ≤ µv,
0 otherwise.
Now x′(δ(w)) ≤ µw for each w ∈ L ∪ R. So, by integrality of the bipartite µ-matching
polytope, val(p′) ≥ ∑e p · x′e as there is an integral matching obtaining at least as much
value as the fractional matching x′.
For any e = uv ∈ E let Be be the bad event that
∑
e′=u′v∈δ(v),e′ 6=e x
′′
e′ ≥ µv − 1. Notice
that the second case in the definition of x′e applies only if event Be happens. We show
Pr[Be] ≤ . If so, for each e = uv ∈ E the fact that Be is independent of the choice of p′(e)
(as G is a simple graph) we then have
E[p′(e) · x′e] ≥ (1−Pr[Be]) · (1− ) ·E
[
p′(e) · xe,p′(e)
yu,p′(e)
]
≥ (1− )2 ·
∑
p∈Pu
p · xe,p.
Summing over all edges, E
[∑
e∈E p
′(e) · x′e
] ≥ (1− 2) ·∑e=uv∑p∈Pu p · xe,p, as required.
To bound Pr[Be], for an edge e′ let Xe′ denote the random variable with value (1− ) ·
xe′,p′(u)/yu′,p′(e′) and let X
e =
∑
e′∈δ(v),e′ 6=eXe′ . Then E[Xe′ ] = (1− ) ·
∑
p∈Pu′ xe′,p so by
7 we have E[Xe] ≤ (1− ) · µv.
Again by simplicity of G, the random variables Xe′ are independent for different e
′ ∈
δ(v), e′ 6= e. Let Y = (1−) ·(µv−1). As Y ≥ E[Xe] and 0 <  < 1, by a standard Chernoff
bound (eg. Theorem 1.1 in [8]) we have Pr[X > (1 + ) · Y ] ≤ exp(−Y 2/3) ≤ . Finally,
since event Be implies Xe ≥ µv − 1 ≥ (1 + ) · Y , we have Pr[Be] ≤ , as required.
The fact that G was simple was used in the application of the Chernoff bound. The
random variables Xe′ for edges in δ(v) for some v ∈ R are independent if G is simple.
19
In fact, this proof generalizes to providing a constant bound on the integrality gap for
any instance, even if capacities are small or there are parallel edges. Simply modify the
proof to first set x′′e =
1
2 ·
xe,p′(e)
yu,p′(e)
and set x′ as before. Instead of Chernoff bounds, just use
Markov’s inequality (which does not require independence, thus does not require G to be
simple) to show Pr[
∑
e′=u′v∈δ(v) x
′′
e ≤ µv] ≥ 12 . Thus, E[x′e] ≥ xe4 .
Lemma 4. The integrality gap of (LP-Pricing) no worse than 1/4 in any instance of
L-Sided Pricing.
The choice of 1/2 in the definition of x′′e is optimal for this analysis. Note, this approx-
imation guarantee is even worse than our single-swap algorithm.
5.2 Proof of Theorem 3
Here we combine the results from Theorem 4 and 8 (or Theorem 13) to provide a better
than 2-approximation for the instances with uniform capacities, where all vertices w ∈ L∪R
have capacity µw = C.
This is obtained using a slightly more refined analysis of the randomized rounding
procedure. We used simpler Chernoff bounds in the proof of Theorem 13 to keep the
bound simpler to state since the main the goal was to show the guarantee for L-Sided
Pricing approaches 1 as C increases. But since we are interested in optimal constants at
this point, we analyze a tighter Chernoff bound.
Theorem 14. The randomized rounding procedure produces a solution for L-Sided Pric-
ing with expected profit at least 0.516 ·OPTLP in simple graphs where all capacities are at
least 22.
Proof. Let α := 0.57. In the analysis of the randomized rounding procedure, we explicitly
constructed a fractional matching after sampling all of the prices. In this proof, we let
x′e = α · xe,p′(e)/yu,p′(e) for each edge e after sampling p′.
For each v ∈ R, each e ∈ δ(v) has x′e being a random value between 0 and 1. Set
v :=
c−1
α·c − 1, so that (1 + v) · α · µv = µv − 1. Since these are independent for different
e and since the expected value of x′(δ(v)) is at most α · µv, then by a Chernoff bound we
have for any e ∈ δ(v) that
Pr[x(δ(v)− {e}) > µv − 1] ≤ Pr[x(δ(v)− {e} ≥ (1 + v) · α · µv] ≤
(
ev
(1 + v)1+v
)α·µv
.
Now, as a function of µv the right hand side increases as µv decreases. Since we assumed
µv ≥ 22, we evaluate this at µv = 22 to get for any µv ≥ 22 that
Pr[x(δ(v)− {e}) > µv − 1] ≤ 0.0937076.
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Continuing as in the proof of Theorem 13, the expected value of x′′e for e = uv when p′(e)
is given is at least
xe,p′(e)/yv,p′(e)
α
· (1−Pr[x(δ(v)− {e}) > µv − 1]) ≥
xe,p′(e
yv,p′(e)
· 0.516.
Therefore, the expected contribution of e’s value to the matching x′′ over the random choice
of p′ is at least 0.516 ·∑p∈Pu p · xe,p. Summing over all e completes the proof.
We can now finish the main proof from this section.
Proof of Theorem 3. If C ≤ 21, use the multiswap local search algorithm to get a solution
with profit ≥ (2141 − )·OPT for L-Sided Pricing. If C ≥ 22, use the randomized rounding
procedure to get a solution whose cost is at least 0.516 ·OPT . For small enough , 0.516 >
21
41 − , so in either case we get profit at least
(
21
41 − 
) · OPT . In terms of approximation
guarantees, this yields an approximation guarantee of at most 1.952381 (again, for small
enough ). Using Lemma 1, we get a 7.8096-approximation for Capacitated Graph
Pricing.
Note, our analysis here may still not be optimal: for example, one could consider a
smoother scaling of x′′ instead of simply discarding edges incident to some v ∈ R whose
capacity is violated and, perhaps, get a smaller “threshold” value for C (smaller than 22)
for which the randomized rounding outperforms the multi-swap algorithm.
6 APX-hardness for L-Sided Pricing
Theorem 15. L-Sided Pricing is APX-hard, even if all capacities are at most 4 and
all customers have a budget of 1 or 2.
Proof. We reduce from the Vertex Cover problem for 3-regular graphs, which is known
to be APX-hard [1]. Let G = (V,E) be a 3-regular graph, with |V | = n nodes and
|E| = m = 3n2 edges.
Construct the following bipartite graph G′ = (L ∪R,E′) from G. Here, L is a copy of
V and R is a copy of V plus a copy of E. Each v ∈ L has capacity 4 and each vertex in R
has a capacity of 1. For a node vi ∈ V , let li denote its copy in L and ri denote its copy
in R. Similarly, for each edge ej ∈ E let dj denote its copy in R.
All customers have budget equal to 1 or 2, and they fall into two classes: node customers
and edge customers. For each vi ∈ V , we have a node customer who is interested in li and
ri with budget 2. For each edge ej = vivk ∈ E, we define two edge customers interested in
lidj and lkdj respectively, both with budget 1. We claim that the optimal solution to this
L-Sided Pricing instance G′ has profit m + 2n − k where k is the size of the smallest
vertex cover of G.
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First, suppose S is a vertex cover ofG with |S| = k. Consider the pricing p with p(li) = 1
if li ∈ S and p(li) = 2 if li /∈ S. As S is a vertex cover in G, for each ej = vivk ∈ E we have
at least one of lidj or lkdj is incident to a vertex with price 1. Form F
′ ⊆ E′ by adding
one such edge from each ej and adding all node customers. We get profit m from edge
customers, profit 2(n− k) from all node customers liri such that vi /∈ S, and profit k from
all node customers liri with vi ∈ S for a total profit of m+ 2n− k.
Conversely, consider an optimal pricing p, so each price is 1 or 2. For ej = vivk ∈ E, we
claim that either p(vi) = 1 or p(vk) = 1. If not, then consider changing p(vi) to 1. We lost
a profit of 1 from the node customer liri but have gained a profit of 1 by adding vidj , which
remains feasible because neither vidj nor vkdj could afford the price of their left-endpoint
before (i.e. dj is not used by any edge that can afford their price under pricing p, so we
may add vidj after adjusting prices).
Set S = {vi : p(li) = 1}. By the above argument, S is a vertex cover of G. Also
observe that the optimal set of edges of G′ under prices p will include every node customer
plus exactly one from each pair {lidj , lkdj} for each ej = vivk ∈ E. So the profit of p is
m+ 2n− |S|.
Therefore, the optimal profit in G′ is exactly 52 ·n− k where k is the size of a minimum
vertex cover of G. There are constants 0 < α < β < 1 such that it is NP-hard to distinguish
between 3-regular graphs having vertex covers of size ≤ α ·n and 3-regular graphs requiring
vertex covers of size ≥ β · n. So it is NP-hard to distinguish between L-Sided Pricing
instances that have optimal profit at least
(
5
2 − α
) · n or at most (52 − β) · n.
7 Conclusion
We presented an 8-approximation for Capacitated Graph Pricing. If all capacities
were bounded from above by a constant or, in simple graphs, were bounded from below
by a sufficiently large constant then we get slightly better approximations. It would be
nice to combine these two cases in a more clever way to beat the 8-approximation in any
Capacitated Graph Pricing instance without an assumption on the uniformity of the
vertex capacities, even if only for simple graphs. But the techniques we use are quite
different and it is not clear how to combine them in a single algorithm that works in the
presence of both small and large capacities.
It would also be interesting to know if the hardness lower bound for Capacitated
Graph Pricing is worse than 4. Intuitively, this could be the case as the L-Sided
Pricing problem we reduce to is APX-hard in the capacitated case.
We also briefly remark that it is simple to get an LP-based O(k2)-approximation for
the generalization of Capacitated Graph Pricing to hypergraphs where each hyperedge
has size ≤ k by first reducing to a bipartite hypergraph where we are only allowed to use
nonzero prices on one side L and each hyperedge has only one vertex in L (losing an
O(k) in the guarantee [3]) and then using standard randomized rounding of the obvious
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generalization of our LP to this setting while losing only an additional O(k) factor. This
problem is a common generalization of the uncapacitated case which has a hardness of
Ω(k1−) [6], and the k-Set Packing problem which has a hardness of Ω(k/ log k) [14].
One then wonders if Capacitated Graph Pricing in hypergraphs could be hard to
approximate better than Ω(k2−). It would be interesting to determine if this is the case
or to see if there is a noticeably better approximation than O(k2), perhaps even O(k).
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A Incorporating Loops
The algorithms presented in this paper assumed every customer was interested in a bundle
with precisely two distinct items. This was done for notational simplicity. However, the
algorithmic results extend very easily to the case where some customers may be only
interested in a single item. The reduction to L-Sided Pricing is valid in this case as
well and we only have to consider singleton customers interested in an item in L. One
can still compute an optimum matching for a given pricing in this case, so the local search
algorithm can still be executed. The analysis of the local search algorithms using test
swaps can then be adapted in a straightforward way by removing singleton customers
from the local optimum and adding singleton customers from the global optimum who are
interested in an item whose price changed when constructing the matching used to generate
the inequality for this swap.
Similarly, the LP-based (1 + )-approximation for L-Sided Pricing with large capac-
ities from Section 5 is is trivial to adapt. The “edge-variables” for singleton customers
interested only an item in L do not contribute to the load of any constraint for any v ∈ R.
The randomized rounding algorithm is identical.
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B Efficient Versions of Local Search
The standard trick to make local search algorithms efficient is to only make an improvement
if it is somewhat noticeable. That is, a swap is performed only if it improves the cost by
a factor of at least 1 + /∆ where ∆ is the total “weight” of all inequalities generated by
test swaps to complete the analysis (typically, ∆ is polynomial in the input size). See [2]
for a specific example of this approach.
However, such analysis typically “loses an ” in the approximation guarantee. We adapt
an alternative approach outlined in [10] that avoids this -loss while still achieving the same
approximation guarantee that a true local optimum is proven to have. We consider the
single-swap algorithm first, the extension to the multi-swap algorithm is in Section B.1.
Recall that the proof of Theorem 9 described a set of test swaps and placed a bound
on the cost change. That is, for each u ∈ L the swap p → pu is considered and a bound
∆u on the change in val() was given as
∆u ≥ p∗(u) · |δB∗(u)| − p(u) · |δB(u)| −
∑
e∈δB′ (u)
p(σ(e)).
Observe this bound holds even if p is not a local optimum solution. The only place in the
proof of Theorem 9 that used the fact that p was a local optimum was in asserting 0 ≥ ∆u,
which is not required here.
Summing the above over all u ∈ L shows∑
u∈L
∆u ≥ val(p∗)− 2 · val(p).
Thus, the u ∈ L with largest ∆u satisfies
∆u ≥ val(p
∗)− 2 · val(p)
|L| .
So if we take the best improvement in each step of the algorithm, the next price p′ then
satisfies
val(p′) ≥ val(p) + val(p
∗)− 2 · val(p)
|L| .
Consider the potential function Φ(p) := val(p∗)− 2 · val(p). If Φ(p) > 0, then Φ(p′) ≤(
1− 2|L|
)
· Φ(p) follows from the expression above. That is, Φ(p) decreases by a factor of
exp(−1) after every |L|/2 iterations as long as the current price p satisfies Φ(p) > 0.
With the standard assumption that the budgets be are expressed as rational numbers
in the input, after a polynomial number of iterations (in the total bit complexity of the
input), we will reach a solution p with Φ(p) ≤ 0, i.e. val(p) ≥ val(p∗)/2 as required,
provided we take the best improvement in each step.
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B.1 Extension to multi-swap
Each swap of the form p→ pu,r for 0 ≤ i ≤ d and u ∈ L in the analysis was weighted with
a value 0 ≤ τ(u, r) ≤ Cd−r. Let κ = Cd+1−1C−1 · |L|, so κ is an upper bound on the total
weight of all test swaps and κ = O(|L|) as C and d are constants.
Again, even if p is not a local optimum our analysis still shows
∑
u∈L,0≤r≤d
τ(u, r) · (val(pu,r)− val(p)) ≥ C
d+1 − 1
C − 1 · val(p
∗)−
(
Cd+1 − 1
C − 1 + C
d
)
· val(p).
Local optimality of p was only used to show the left-hand side was not positive. Without
local optimality, we may still conclude the most improving swap p→ p′ satisfies
val(p′) ≥ val(p) + 1
κ
·
(
Cd+1 − 1
C − 1 · val(p
∗)−
(
Cd+1 − 1
C − 1 + C
d
)
· val(p)
)
.
Consider the potential function
φ(p) =
Cd+1 − 1
C − 1 · val(p
∗)−
(
Cd+1 − 1
C − 1 + C
d
)
· val(p).
The above bound shows if φ(p) > 0 then choosing the best improving swaps will result in
a solution p′ with φ(p′) ≤
(
1−
(
Cd+1−1
C−1 + C
d
)
· 1κ
)
·φ(p). So φ(p) decreases geometrically
every O(κ) iterations as long as it remains positive. As κ = O(|L|) and by using rationality
of the input values, the potential φ(p) will become nonpositive after a polynomial number
of iterations in the total bit complexity of the input as long as we take the most improving
swap.
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